Regolamenti parlamentari e trasformazione della Costituzione nel superamento del bicameralismo paritario

di Gian Luca Conti

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa: regolamenti parlamentari e riforma della Costituzione, l’avanguardia inerte e l’inerzia avanguardista. - 2. La riforma costituzionale può effettivamente superare il bicameralismo paritario senza il concorso dei regolamenti parlamentari? - Regolamenti parlamentari e superamento del bicameralismo paritario: la composizione delle Camere. - 4. Regolamenti parlamentari e superamento del bicameralismo paritario: i diritti delle minoranze e lo statuto delle opposizioni. - 5. Regolamenti parlamentari e superamento del bicameralismo paritario: le accelerazioni nel procedimento legislativo. - 6. Conclusioni.

The constitutional law approved the second time for the first deliberation on Oct 13th, 2015 by the Italian Senate faces the principle that each branch of the Parliament must comply only with the rules approved by the same branch. Parliamentary rules are, often, the forefront of the change for the parliament institutions but, at the same time, when the Constitution changes, parliamentary rules cannot change and obstacle the constitutional reform through the force of inaction. The article intends to investigate how parliamentary rules can influence the fundamental reform which mr. Renzi and mrs. Boschi wanted, not to predict if thy shall obstacle or favorite the aims of the reform, but only to fix the areas of the reform which shall be most influenced by the change or the lack of change of the parliamentary rules. In the constitutional history of Italy, most of the times, a constitutional reform is accompanied by the inaction of the Parliament in the implementation of the parliamentary rules while, when a constitutional reform fails, the Parliament could change his rules so to mitigate the consequences of the failure to reform the Constitution. The question is how parliamentary rules can contribute to the aim of closing the deficit of bicameralism. The contribution of parliamentary rules to move away from the perfect bicameralism is a key point in facing the following issues: (i) regarding the composition of the Senate: it is clear that the new Senate shall be composed by a number of senators not proportional with the population resident in each region. Each region designates not less than two senators but five regions and two provinces would not designate two senators referring their population. So senators do not represent the nation or the citizens but represent the institution which designated them. Parliamentary rules consequently shall regulate (or not regulate) parliamentary groups - in the Senate - as nonpolitical groups; (ii) regarding the composition of the Senate: if parliamentary groups are non-political groups, Parliamentary rules shall regulate (or not regulate) standing committees on that ground and maybe standing committees shall not have a political role in the life of the Senate; (iii) regarding the parliamentary powers of inquiry, the Senate shall investigate only the matters of local interest and parliamentary rules shall shape the composition of the inquiry committee so to make it representative of each local institution; (iv) the provision to protect minorities in the parliamentary rules faces the provision to establish a status of political opposition. In the Senate, parliamentary rules shall define the minorities' rights as non-political opposition rights; (v) parliamentary rules shall play a key role in shaping legislative function. Last but not least, the constitutional reform regulates the Senate in the legislative function analytically, but it is very short and condensed with regard to the other functions. Parliamentary rules can close the gap between the prevision of these functions and the ability to exercise them?