di Paolo Caretti

di Giovanna De Minico

SOMMARIO: 1. I termini del discorso. – 2. La risposta del lawmaker: la Direttiva 2017/541 sulla lotta contro il terrorismo. - 3. La reazione del giudice europeo: Digital Rights Ireland e Schrems. – 4. Come hanno funzionato i checks and balances tra legislatore e giudice europeo?

In this essay the Author reflects about three topics.
Which are the effects of the terrorism of the ordinary time on the European rulemaking and the judicial review?
If has the abstract model of the “law of fear” with its compliance with the precautionary and proportionality criteria been respected by the recent Directive 2017/541 on combatting terrorism?
And finally if have the checks and balances worked well between the European Lawmaker and the Judge concerning to this field?
In conclusion reflection the Author wishes that the European legislator was able to rebalance the regolative measure combining the security with the fundamental rights at the moment entirely stressed on the latter. This shift could be necessary in order to let the European system go back to the legal normality when the state of emergency will be over.

di Monica Rosini

SOMMARIO: 1. Le criticità della “fase discendente” e le risposte della legge n. 234/2012. - 2. Il quadro normativo: la legge di delegazione europea. - 3. … e la legge europea. - 4. La legge di delegazione europea e la legge europea alla prova dell’esperienza applicativa. - 5. Le (limitate) novità delle tecniche di recepimento: la delega legislativa. - 5.1. La problematica formulazione dei “principi e criteri direttivi”. - 5.2. Il “tempo limitato”. - 5.3. I “limiti ulteriori” della delegazione legislativa. - 6. L’attuazione in via regolamentare e amministrativa. - 7. La legge europea e la sopradica attuazione del diritto UE. - 8. Alcune considerazioni conclusive.

The article analyses the changes in the implementation of EU Law in the Italian system, introduced by Act no. 234 of 2012. This act has introduced two new instruments in order to make transposition of EU law more timely and effective: the European Delegation Act and the European Act. The article deals with contents, approval rules, and purposes of these two new legislative acts, in the light of their four-year implementation.

di Franck Lafaille

SOMMARIO: 1. Prolégomènes. UE et révisionnisme constitutionnel. – 2. Le refus du Conseil constitutionnel de con-trôler la conventionnalité des lois. – 3. De la spécificité du droit de l’UE, en droit UE et en droit français. – 4. La supériorité de la Constitution…dans l’ordre interne. – 5. L’obligation constitutionnelle de trans-position des directives (1) : l’octroi d’un régime abnorme aux directives UE. – 6. L’obligation constitu-tionnelle de transposition des directives (2) : l’identité constitutionnelle de la France. – 7. Transposition des directives UE et supériorité de la Constitution : à propos de la jurisprudence Arcelor du Conseil d’Etat. – 8. QPC, supériorité de la Constitution, supériorité du droit UE : à propos de la jurisprudence Melki. – 9. Epilogue. A propos d’une trilogie identitaire constitutionnelle : trois ordres juridiques, trois constitutions matérielles, trois juges constitutionnels.

The political will to foster European integration led to the adoption of European acts that required constitutional modifications of the French Constitution. Since 1992 several modifications of our fundamental law were adopted. The Conseil constitutionnel played a central role in this process: it represents the authority to indicate if it is necessary - or not - to change the Constitution. At first reluctant to judge the normative relationship between constitutional norms and EU norms, the Conseil recently decided to innovate. In this sense, the “discovery” of the French Constitutional Identity was a crucial judicial moment: the Conseil constitutionnel ruled both that transposition of UE directives is a constitutional obligation, and that EU law can’t affect the French Constitutional Identity (whose material substance is not clearly identified). Thus, two different kinds of constitutional law seem to coexist in France: one acting as a barrier to EU law (as, mutatis mutandis, the Italian “principi supreme”) and thus superior to EU law, and a second one that can’t be a limit EU law. At last, the French constitutional actors seem to understand that they can’t dodge this issue: the normative supremacy of the EU material Constitution and the judicial supremacy of the European Court of Justice. How to find a legal compromise when two norms and two judges pretend to prevail? The French judges’ implicit answer is logical and hypocritical: there is no con-flict thanks to the theory of equivalency of values.

di Marta Tomasi

SOMMARIO: 1. La “dimensione comunitaria” degli enti infra-statali e la “dimensione regionale” dell’implementazione del diritto dell’Unione europea – 2. L’implementazione in Italia di meccanismi volti al controllo, alla gestione e alla limitazione del contenzioso per violazione del diritto dell’Unione europea – 3. Il potere sostitutivo dello Stato e le insostituibili responsabilità delle Regioni e degli enti locali nell’attuazione del diritto dell’Unione europea – 4. Il diritto di rivalsa nel dialogo inter-soggettivo fra Stato e Regioni - 4.1. Profili procedurali del diritto di rivalsa: la Corte costituzionale e il necessario coinvolgimento istituzionale dei diversi livelli di governo - 4.2. Profili contenutistici del diritto di rivalsa: la Corte costituzionale e l’accertamento delle responsabilità “in concreto”- 4.3. Il primo caso di esercizio del diritto di rivalsa per mancata esecuzione di una sentenza di condanna della Corte di Giustizia. Il richiamo alla concretezza da parte del TAR Lazio – 5. Cenni conclusivi.

In the phase concerning the implementation of EU law, the internal allocation of powers plays a fundamental role.
Nonetheless, even if the 2001 constitutional reform in Italy has promoted a more active participation of the Italian Regions in the law-making process and in the implementation of EU law, the EU system continues to be characterised by the liability of a Member State before the EU institutions for violations of EU obligations even when these violations are ultimately ascribable to its Regions.
This paper aims to investigate instruments adopted within the Italian domestic legal order to make infra-State bodies accountable for violations of EU obligations. In particular the analysis will focus on the interactions between the substitutive power played by the national State and the “right to recourse” that allows the State to re-quest damages to non-compliant Regions. The study will focus on their functioning, degree of effectiveness and concrete application and, in synthesis, on how they contribute to a virtuous implementation of EU law.
To this aim, some recent judgments, from the Constitutional Court and from an administrative tribunal (TAR Lazio) will be presented. All of these decisions basically agree on the importance of evaluating the concrete and specific relevance of regional or local responsibilities.
The reported examples show a key for reading and correctly interpreting and applying the instruments created by the Italian legal order to ensure a proper and proactive EU law implementation.

di Patricia Popelier

SOMMARIO: 1. Setting the scene: the Belgian implementation score. – 2. The Belgian toolbox for the implementation of EU law. - 2.1. The constitutional framework and the delegation of the power to implement EU laws. - 2.2. Legal instruments – 3. Key actors in the implementation process. - 4. The federal system in the case of non-compliance by regional entities. - 5. Cases: Best Practices and Bad Practices - 6. Conclusions.

di Maria Bertel

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduction – 2. Implementation of EU Law – 3. Two systems, separate but intertwined – 4. The Austrian legal framework for the implementation – 5. Aspects of implementation – 6. Conclusions.

The following paper analyses the implementation of EU law into Austrian law. I will in a first step define the term of “implementation”, as the further analysis varies depending on the scope of the definition. Opting for a rather broad definition allows to examine all three state powers, i.e. legislation, administration and judiciary. I will then present selected challenges the different state powers are facing when implementing EU law (e.g. chal-lenges arising from the Austrian federal system, coordination, etc.).
In order to better understand these challenges, it is necessary to set out the constitutional framework for the implementation. This encompasses, amongst others, aspects of the constitutional distribution of competences and the role of the legality principle in the Austrian legal system which explains the fundamental role the legislator plays in implementing EU law.
Moreover, special consideration is given to the Constitutional Court, which after its 2012 land-mark judgement treats some guarantees of the Fundamental Rights Charter as a standard of scrutiny when assessing the constitutionality of infra-constitutional law (of laws and administrative and judicial decisions).