1. Introduction

The framework of political parties that emerged after the Carnation Revolution in 1974 (which put an end to the authoritarian regime of more than 40 years known as the Estado Novo – e.g., Robert M. Fishman, “What 25 April Was and Why It Mattered”, Portuguese Studies, 2018, 34, no. 1, pp. 20-34, https://doi.org/10.5699/portstudies.34.1.0020.)) has remained relatively stable until today. Essentially, the two largest parties date back to 1975, and no political party has been dissolved since July 2009 (Comissão Nacional de Eleições, 2024; and, e.g., Romano Orrù, “Le ‘legislative’ portoghesi e l’attrattività del governo minoritario nel gioco politico a ‘mosse obbligate’”, Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo, 2/2024, p. 51, doi: 10.17394/113892). However, fourteen of the twenty-four political parties have been constituted since 2009 (idem).

In recent years, the internal life of parties in Portugal has been the cause of significant litigation and media coverage  (e.g., “Constitutional Court again rejects PAN statutes, party will be forced to hold Congress”, 17.04.2024; “Constitutional Court accepts registration of New Right party after three rejections for irregularities”, 09.01.2024; “Left Bloc to rectify amendment to statutes rejected by Constitutional Court”, 14.02.2024). In this context, more attention has been given to intraparty democracy by the public, by middle-level party elites - “traditionally more involved in decision-making and more committed to organisational stability” -, and especially by parties’ general members (Marco Lisi, “Democracia intra-partidária, filiados e elites intermédias: o caso do Partido Socialista português”, Análise Social, 2015, vol. 50, no. 214, pp. 24-25).

There has been significative constitutional case law on political parties in recent years (e.g., Judgements 2/2011, 145/2013, 177/2019, 534/2019, 95/2020, 155/2020, 226/2021, 387/2021, 942/2021 326/2022, 470/2022, 751/2022, 844/2022 374/2023, 504/2023, 542/2022 699/2023, 864/2023, 929/2023, and 126/2024). The main issues include the approval and amendment of parties’ statutes, the election procedure of holders of office in political parties, compliance with party statutes of elective acts and other decisions, namely, the application of disciplinary sanctions to militants (e.g., for publicly expressing disagreement with the party's positions or the party's lists of candidates for a given election) and the control of accounts submitted by political parties.

The number of cases and the subjects they address raise the question of what they reflect about the Portuguese political and party system and how they relate to the decline of democracy and the rule of law. In the present work, the objective is to present such case law and put it in the context of the deficits of democracy in Portugal. First, the fundamental legal framework of political parties is described. The Constitutional Court's sphere of competence with respect to political parties is then summarised. After, the main questions on which the Constitutional Court has focused are explained (with the exception of political parties’ accounts, which are worthy of a specific analysis - Beatriz Rebelo Garcia, “The Control of Political Parties' Accounts by the Portuguese Constitutional Court”, September 3, 2022, Lisbon Public Law Working Paper No. 2023-4, https://ssrn.com/abstract=4498940)). Finally, some of the related problems of Portuguese democracy are mentioned, bearing in mind the international assessment of its deterioration.

 

2. Fundamental legal framework of political parties

The Portuguese Constitution has several provisions on political parties in its different parts, including fundamental principles (Part I), fundamental rights (Part II), the organisation of political power (Part III), and the guarantee and revision of the Constitution (Part IV). The dense constitutional regulation reflects the understanding that although parties have a private legal nature and therefore freedom of self-organisation, they are not just any private entities (e.g., Jorge Pereira da Silva, “O estatuto constitucional dos partidos politicos portugueses”, Direito e Justiça, Volume XII, 1998, tomo 2, p. 184) and are a contrapuntal reaction to the experience of the authoritarian regime previous to 1974 (Isabella Razzuoli, “Os partidos politicos na Constituição da República italiana e portuguesa. Uma análise dos artigos constitucionais”, ICJP/CIDP, pp. 24-25).

As a fundamental principle, it states, “political parties exist in order to contribute to the organisation and expression of the will of the people, with respect for the principles of national independence, the unity of the state and political democracy” (Article 10, Part I). The Constitution enshrines the right to form or take part in parties and “through them to work jointly and democratically towards the formation of the popular will and the organisation of political power” (Article 51 (1), Part II). The scope and main features of the regime on political partes are delimited by the Constitution as follows:

i) A person cannot be part of more than one party (Article 52(2), first part);

ii) The membership of a party must not benefit or harm the respective subjects or deprive them of the exercise of any right (Article 52(2), second part), namely, regarding appointments, jobs or professional careers or social benefits (Article 50(2)), although there is no legislation that effectively guarantees this;

iii) “Political parties shall be governed by the principles of transparency, democratic organisation and management, and participation by all their members” (Article 51(5));

iv) A political party that is racist or displays a fascist ideology is not permitted (Article 46(4) and, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, CERD/C/PRT/18-19, 24 June 2020, Combined eighteenth and nineteenth periodic reports submitted by Portugal under article 9 of the Convention, due in 2019, p. 14););

v) Political parties have the fundamental rights to broadcasting time, reply and political response (Article 40);

vi) “Political parties shall hold seats in the bodies that are elected by universal, direct suffrage in accordance with their proportion of election results” (Article 114(1) of Part III [organisation of political power]); the electoral system is organized according to the principle of proportional representation - Article 113(5) of the Constitution).

vii) When they do not take part in the government, parties have to be regularly informed about the main matters of public interest (Article 114(3));

viii) The right to democratic opposition must be guaranteed (Article 114(2));

ix) Candidates for the Assembly of the Republic's elections are presented by political parties, which may include citizens who are not registered with any of the parties in question (Article 151(1), Part III) and must not include candidates on another list (Article 151(2), idem).

The Assembly of the Republic has the exclusive responsibility to legislate on political associations and parties (Article 164-h) of the Constitution). Under this provision, the law governing political parties (Organisational Law no. 2/2003 of 22 August 2003, amended by Organisation Law no. 2/2008 of 14 May 2008 and Organisational Law no. 1/2018 of 19 April 2018) was enacted. This law sets out principles and rules that are intended to be in line with a liberal democracy, in which political parties “must respect human dignity, democracy, the rule of law, equality, and fundamental rights” and reflect such respect in their internal organisation – Principles 1 and 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Constitutional Principles of a European Democracy, European Law Institute, 2024. The law reflects the consensus that political parties contribute to the free formation and plural expression of popular will and to the organisation of political power, playing a mediating role between society and the institutions of representation (Articles 2 and 3). It states that political parties:

i) Are formed freely and without authorisation requirements (Article 4(1));

ii) Pursue their purposes freely and without interference from public authorities, save for the jurisdictional controls provided for in the Constitution and the law (Article 4(2));

iii) Must be governed by the principles of democratic organisation and management and of participation by all their members and must pursue their purposes publicly (Articles 5 and 6);

iv) Every member of a political party has equal rights under its articles of association (Article 5(2));

v) The elective mandates must be freely exercised under the terms and conditions set out in the statute governing the holders of the respective office and in the rules on the elected organ’s modus operandi and the exercise of its competences (Article 23).

3. Constitutional Court jurisdiction over political parties

The Constitutional Court's jurisdiction in matters of political parties is delimited by the Constitution and is concretised in a wide range of competences in the Law on the Organisation, Functioning and procedure of the Constitutional Court (Law no. 28/82, of 15 November, modified by Law no. 143/85, of 26 November, Law no. 85/89, of 7 September, Law no. 88/95, of 1 September, Law no. 13-A/98, of 26 February, and Organic Law no. 1/2001, of 30 November - (hereafter referred to as the law on the Constitutional Court) in conjunction with the Political Parties Law (e.g., Judgment no. 374/2023, II.7).

The law on the Constitutional Court in conjunction with the Political Parties Law details the competence and procedures regarding litigation by political parties. The Constitutional Court:

i) Has the power to verify the legality of the formation of a political party (Article 223(2)-e) of the Constitution); it determines the enrolment of political parties in the Court's register (Article 14 of the Political Parties Law and Article 103 of the Law on the Constitutional Court). Each political party must communicate to the Constitutional Court the identity of the members of its national bodies after their election, as well as the statutes, declarations of principles and programmes once approved or after any modification (Article 6(3) of the Law on political parties).

ii) Regarding the statutes, has the power to declare illegal political parties’ articles of association upon request from the Public Prosecutors’ Office (Article 16(3) of the Law on political parties);

iii) Regarding decisions made by political party organs (e.g., electoral and functioning regulations – Judgment 504/2023), has the responsibility to judge their legality on the grounds of infringement of statutory rules (Article 30 of the Law on political parties) and “on the grounds of serious violation of essential rules relating to competence or to the democratic functioning of the party” (Article 103-D, no. 2, idem; e.g., Judgment 504/2023, nos. 56-64 [illegal constitution and functioning of the organ that approved internal rules]). As for “punitive decisions of the respective party organs taken in a disciplinary process”, the Constitutional Court can quash them “on the grounds of illegality or violation of a statutory rule” (Article 103-D, no. 1, of the law on the Constitutional Court);

iv) Concerning the election of holders of offices in organs of political parties (Article 223(2)-h), of the Constitution), any militant who is a voter or candidate in the election in question may contest the election in the Constitutional Court, as well as militants whose registration has been omitted when there are omissions in the electoral rolls or lists (Article 103-C), no. 1, of the law on the Constitutional Court);

v) Considers that “only the final act of the electoral procedure - as a rule, the electoral act itself - can be independently challenged, and in the context of this challenge, the validity of the intermediate acts of that same procedure can be analysed” (Judgment 78/2013, 9.1., § 1; Judgment 145/2013, II.5 [which also considers the decision that declares the electoral procedure null and void as a final act of the specific electoral procedure to which it refers]);

vi) Has the competence to decide on the abolition of political parties on specific grounds, e.g., if it is racist or displays a fascist ideology (Article 223(2)-e) of the Constitution, Article 104 of the Law on the Constitutional Court and Articles 17 and 18 of the Law Governing Political Parties).

4. Recent case-law on political parties

As mentioned above, in recent years, the Constitutional Court has been called upon to decide questions regarding the legal status of political parties and the legality of decisions made by their organs. The former concerns mainly the extent of the material reservation of statutes (infra, a)), and the latter concerns the extent of self-government of political parties, with a view to guaranteeing the principles of democracy and transparency (infra, b)) and the right to due process in disciplinary matters (infra, c)).

a) Reservation of statutes

The Law governing political parties identifies the following as statutory matters: (i) the criteria to “form organisations internally or establish associative relations with other organisations” (Article 13); (ii) the rules on dissolution of a political party (Article 17); (iii) the competences and composition of party organs (Articles 24, and 25(2)); (iv) the participation of women and men in political activities and “guarantee [of] the absence of gender discrimination in access to party organs and in the election nominations submitted by the political party” (Article 28), which implies that party statutes “must contain express rules on positive discrimination (…) and express rules prohibiting negative discrimination” (Judgment 864/2023, II. 41); (v) the duration of terms of office of party officers (Article 29(3)); (vi) removal of party officers (Article 31(2)); and (vi) the holding of internal referenda on political questions that are important to the party (Article 32(1)).

The most recent case-law of the Constitutional Court has deepened the concept and scope of the material reservation of statutory competence. This means that the main aspects of political parties’ self-regulation must be defined in their statutes and not in secondary internal provisions. In Judgment 387/2021, the Constitutional Court stated, “[t]his reservation is necessary because the Constitutional Court's control of legality and constitutionality, under the terms of article 6(3) of the LPP [Law governing political parties], specifically concerns party statutes” (II.10.3). This provision establishes that “[e]ach political party shall notify the Constitutional Court (…) of its articles of association, declarations of principles and programme following their approval and after each amendment, so that the Constitutional Court may take note thereof”. Regarding internal discipline, the Court stressed, “it must be understood that there is a reservation of statutes for all those essential aspects of the disciplinary system whose enshrinement is a necessary condition for its conformity with the requirements arising from the relevant constitutional and legal rules. These include the distribution of jurisdiction over the imposition of sanctions and the assessment of challenges to them, or the rules that define the guarantees of impartiality and independence that the judicial body must have” (Judgment 387/2021, II.10.5; Judgment 864/2023, II. 34, § 4).

This case-law on the reservation of statutes has been replicated in several subsequent judgments. For example, (i) in Judgment 542/2022, the Court stated, “the internal regulations cannot contradict the Statutes, namely, by creating barriers to access to the courts that are not the result of the Statute” (2.4., § 3); (ii) in Judgment 751/2022, it stated, “the version of the Statutes in question does not comply with the requirement well explained in Judgment no. 387/2021, according to which it is part of the reserve of statutes, as it constitutes an essential rule of the disciplinary and sanctioning regime, to define the terms of distribution of competences regarding the application of sanctions and the assessment of challenges to them” (II.17, § 10); (iii) in Judgment 122/23, the Court rejected a request to annotate the Statutes of the CDS-PP [Centro Democrático Social - Partido Popular party because they did not ensure the determinability of the sanctioning regime with respect to aspects subject to statutory reservation (II.9.3.1) nor guarantee that decisions made in disciplinary matters could be scrutinised by an independent internal body (II.9.3.2); and (iv) in Judgement no. 864/23, the Constitutional Court stressed that the statutory typification of punishable behaviour constitutes a commitment to democratic principles and safeguards the rights of militants (II.32, § 3).

Judgment 126/2024 reiterated the same understanding. In this case, the Constitutional Court ruled that the preventive measure of disciplinary suspension was not sufficiently provided for in the PEOPLE-ANIMAL-NATURE Party’s statutes. The Court stated, “this precautionary measure, being provided for only in the Party's Disciplinary Regulations, is undoubtedly illegal, grossly violating the material reservation of statutes” (no. 13). Similarly, the Constitutional Court found that the secondary provisions on the exhaustion of internal means of controlling the legality of disciplinary sanction decisions violated such reservation due to their innovative character. In this case, the principle of minimum intervention in the internal life of political parties and their freedom of political action - under which the Court acknowledged the principle of exhaustion of internal means of controlling the legality and respect for party statutes (II.8 and, e.g., Judgment 699/2023, II.5) - could not be applied. The Court stated, “the rule that could lead to the Party's internal appeals not being exhausted (…) is also illegal, because to be valid it would have to be provided for in the Statutes” (126/2024, II.15, § 2).

b) Principles of transparency and democracy

Traditionally, the Constitutional Court has taken an explicit position of minimal control over the internal life of political parties. It stated that the principle of self-restraint “is an expression of the necessary practical harmony between party and association autonomy (…) and the need to guarantee that the activity of political parties, given their structuring role in a State governed by the rule of law, is carried out in accordance with the limits established in the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, namely, with respect for the essential principles of transparency, organisation, democratic management and the participation of all its members (cf. Article 51(5) of the Constitution)”; this statement appeared in Judgment 78/2023, II.6, § 4, which also concerns the “safeguarding of equality of opportunities in the political competition” (Martin Morlok, “A Comparative Presentation on Constitutional Courts as Guardians of Competition between Political Parties”, Juridica International, XIII/2007, p. 99). In Judgment 751/2022, in the context of the assessment of amendments to articles of association, the Constitutional Court noted, “despite the very wide scope for political parties to shape their internal organisation, minimum levels of transparency, coherence and democracy (…) must be demanded which, if not guaranteed by a party's statutes, should lead to its annotation being refused” (II.14, i)).

The principle of transparency requires, for example, that: (i) political parties publicly pursue their aims and publicise the essential aspects of their internal organisation and life, which includes publicising their statutes, the identity of their party officers, declarations of principles, programmes, manifestoes and their general activities at the national and international levels (Article 6(1) and (2) and Judgment 122/2023, II.4, § 5)); (ii) the provisions on internal discipline enable parties “to understand, from a reading of a party's statutes, what their duties are, what the sanctions are for noncompliance, and how disciplinary powers are exercised (which body has the power to apply which sanctions, and which body is appealed to and under what conditions)” (Judgment 751/2022, II.17, § 11); and (iii) the internal structure of parties have “a clear and articulated distribution of competences between the statutory bodies in a way that is not contradictory or antinomian” that enables militants and people in general “to understand which party body, and under what terms, can exercise a certain competence or take a certain act”, which favours “participation in the internal life of the party, under democratic conditions” (Judgment 751/2022, no. 14, i); in Judgment no. 929/2023, the CC asserted, “[a]lthough CHEGA's Statutes do not expressly provide for the impossibility of lodging an internal appeal against the CJN's decisions, it follows from the organisation, systematisation and very content of the Statutes that this is impossible” (II.8).

The members of a political party must be able to “formulate their preferences”, “signify their preferences to their fellow[s]” and have them “weighed equally in the conduct of the government” of the party (Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1971, pp. 1-2). As such, “[e]very member of a political party shall possess equal rights under its articles of association” (Article 5(2) of the Law governing Political Parties).

The internal discipline of political parties cannot preclude the exercise of rights by their members (Article 22 of the Law governing Political Parties). Regarding the right to join other associations and bodies, the Constitutional Court judged disproportional the statutory prohibition on members of the “Chega” Party joining "associations and organisations indirectly associated" with another party. The Court noted that the “interpretative breadth of this expression is likely to encompass the prohibition of membership of associations without any party-political character, but which, by the nature of their activities and purposes, can be identified with the political proposals of [other] parties” (Judgment 751/2022, II.16, § 4). In a declaration of vote, regarding this aspect, it has been argued that the prohibition should be evaluated in concrete terms and, as such, the provision should not have been rejected (Pedro Machete, no. 2). From another perspective, it has been pointed out this prohibition “could prevent the members of Chega from joining not only trade unions linked to other parties but also other types of associations” and caused “uncertainty on the party’s objectives with regard to the trade union movement” (Hermes Augusto Costa and Raquel Rego, “Trade unions and right-wing populism in Europe, Country Study Portugal”, Herausgebende Abteilung: Internationale Zusammenarbeit, Globale und Europäische Politik, Bonn, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V, April 2023 p. 7)..

c) Disciplinary procedural guarantees

Some of the Court’s judgments have analysed compliance with due process guarantees of disciplinary procedures and whether there was an “abusive and unjustifiable exercise of sanctioning powers by the Party's internal bodies” (Judgement no. 511/2023, II.8, § 4). For example, in Judgment 511/2023, the Constitutional Court upheld an action brought by a party member appealing a decision that expelled him on the grounds that it had failed to set, within the minimum and maximum limits, a period during which the applicant could not be readmitted as a member of the party by means of a new enrolment, as normatively required (II.10). In Judgment 396/2021, the Court considered relevant that in a disciplinary procedure (which ended with the sanction of suspension from the party for up to two years), “the defendant's file was not attached to the case file of its own motion, as [normatively] required (…), nor were the documents requested by the defendant attached to the case file, all the witnesses listed by the defendant were not heard, and [that] this happened without the defendant being notified, either to comment on the incidences that led to this non-hearing, and of the decision that was made to that effect”. The Court concluded that the “guarantees of a hearing and defence were not respected” (Article 32(10) of the Constitution and Article 22(2) of the Law on Political Parties).

In  122/2023, the Court highlighted that the guarantee of scrutiny of decisions handed down in disciplinary matters through “a double degree of assessment by different bodies or by different formations within the structure of the same disciplinary body, in order to safeguard the requirements of impartiality and independence, both objectively and subjectively” was not respected (II.9.3.2). The granting of exclusive decision-making powers to a disciplinary body, without at the same time ensuring that members could lodge a complaint under the terms mentioned above, led to the refusal to annotate the amendments to the statutes (Judgment 864/2023, II.34, § 6). With respect to the rights to defence and prior hearing, as well as the right to appeal, the importance of providing in the party statutes a specific deadline for the decisions and the respective notification was stressed (II.35).

The extensive case law raises several questions, including how to interpret it in the context of the deterioration of democracy in Portugal.

5. Case-law on political parties and Portugal as an electoral and flawed democracy

In 2023, Portugal fell from being a liberal democracy to being an electoral democracy (V-Dem Institute, Democracy Winning and Losing at the Ballot: Democracy Report 2024, March 7, 2024, p. 15 and pp. 59-60) or a flawed democracy (The Economist Intelligence Unit [EIU], Democracy Index 2023, Age of Conflict, 2024, pp. 11, 20, 38). Portugal scores well in terms of the following criteria: “multiparty elections for the executive are free and fair”, “satisfactory degrees of suffrage”, freedom of expression and freedom of association (V-Dem Institute) and “protection of civil liberties”, “electoral process and pluralism (e.g., free and fair elections)” and civil liberties, e.g., freedom of expression and media freedoms (EIU). It scores worse in “judicial and legislative constraints on the executive” and “equality before the law” (V-Dem Institute) and regarding the functioning of government (e.g., corruption, insufficient transparency and a lack of accountability), political participation, and political culture (e.g., popular support for democracy) - EIU.

Engagement “in public discourse, to elect representatives, and to join political parties” is essential to democracy (EIU, Democracy Index, cit., p. 65). In the absence of comprehensive and enduring participation, the democratic process begins to erode, giving rise to a system dominated by small and select groups (idem). The degree of participation is also important for safeguarding the legitimacy of elections (e.g., Venice Commission, Interim Report on the measures taken in the EU member States as a result of the Covid-19 crisis and their impact on democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights (CDL-AD(2020)018-e), p. 31, no. 134). In Portugal, the abstention rate in parliamentary elections has increased progressively over the years, reaching a peak of 51.4% in 2019 and then slightly declining (to 48.6% in 2022 and to 40.2% in 2024). The number of political party members fell by 30 percent between 1974 and 2014 (Espírito Santo, P., & Costa, B. F., “Filiados e militantes partidários: perfis da filiação partidária numa perspetiva comparada”, Revista Lusófona de Estudos Culturais, 2017, 4(2), 109-129. https://doi.org/10.21814/rlec.245) and was estimated at 2 percent of the population in December 2023 (Espírito Santo, P. & Lisi, M., 2023). The electoral system is organised according to the principle of proportional representation (Article 113(5) of the Constitution). Together with the constituencies geographically defined by law (Article 149 of the Constitution) and the fact that it is only possible to vote for party lists (closed lists), proportional representation has some drawbacks, such as the "waste" of voting for a party that does not elect anyone in certain constituencies and, to some extent, the fragmentation of the Parliament. In this context, the needs for “compensation constituencies” and the evolution of a “mixed system of personalised proportional representation” have been identified (e.g., Institute of Public Policy, "Reforming the Electoral System: Renewing Democracy" [“Reformar o Sistema Eleitoral: Renovar a Democracia”), 4 July 2024; Diogo Ribeiro Santos, “Compensation circle... or not! The electoral system for the Assembly of the Republic (AR) combines the worst of both worlds: it's reasonably disproportionate and doesn't bring the elected closer to the voters”, Observador, 8 July 2024).

The Constitutional case-law in reference to political parties reflects the dynamics of political parties in Portugal, with the creation of new parties, the loss of parliamentary representation of others (e.g., Assembleia da República, 2022 and 2024; and José M. Magone, “Portugal: Political Developments and Data in 2022”, European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook, 2023, pp. 411 and 421, https://doi.org/10.1111/2047-8852.12422) and the emergence of parties identified with nonmoderate right-wing ideology (e.g. Rahul Kumar, “Marchi, Riccardo [2020], A nova direita anti-sistema: o caso do Chega”, Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais [Online], 2021, 125, http://journals.openedition.org/rccs/12314; https://doi.org/10.4000/rccs.12314). It can be argued that this shows a contrapuntal dialogue between constitutional principles regarding the role of political parties in a democratic state on the basis of the rule of law (Article 2 of the Constitution) and relevant Constitutional Court scrutiny of the lawfulness of the organisation and self-government of political parties. It seems that the Constitutional Court has been more diligent in its task of controlling the internal democracy and lawfulness of political parties and less deferential to the idea of minimum intervention (repeatedly affirmed by the Court over the years, e.g., Judgment 136/2012, II.9, § 5). The Constitutional Court is composed of thirteen judges, ten of whom are appointed by the Assembly of the Republic and three of whom are chosen by those ten (Article 222(1) and Article 162-h) of the Constitution). In fact, the judges are chosen by an informal convention by the two major parties (“PS and PSD agree on six new Constitutional Court judges”, RTP Notícias, 21 March 2007; On the election of judges to the Constitutional Court, PCP party website, 15 July 2016). In 2009, Sofia Amaral-Garcia et al. (“Judicial Independence and Party Politics in the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: The Case of Portugal”, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2009, Volume 6, Issue 2, p. 381, https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/622) noted, “constitutional judges in Portugal are quite sensitive to their political affiliations and their political party's presence in government when voting”. Although this observation may still be relevant, broadening of the party spectrum may somewhat explain the variation in the diligence of the Constitutional Court.