di Erik Longo

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione. – 2. Il difficile rapporto tra nuove tecnologie e l’emergere di una sfera pubblica europea. – 3. L’approccio regolatorio europeo. – 4. Una nuova spinta per la democrazia digitale nell’Ue: la Conferenza sul futuro dell’Unione europea. – 5. Il Piano d’azione per la democrazia in Europa. – 6. Spunti conclusivi.

This article provides an overview of the relationship between the democratic participation tools and the digital revolution at a European Union level. The first part critically analyzes the contribution that the tools of the digital society can offer to reinvigorate democratic processes within the political context of the European Union and the risks that can derive from the development of related technologies. In the second part, the article discusses firstly the process set in motion by the “Joint Declaration” adopted by the EU institutions in March 2021 for a “Conference on the Future of Europe” and secondly the European Democracy Action Plan that aims at ensuring that citizens can participate in the democratic system through informed decision-making free from unlawful interference and manipulation.

di Maria Eugenia Bartoloni

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa. – 2. Il quadro giuridico/costituzionale in cui collocare la regolazione privata: il sistema della delega dei poteri. – 2.1. La regolazione privata come “ulteriore” forma di delega di poteri. – 2.2. Le condizioni per il conferimento di una delega di poteri a soggetti privati. – 3. Il quadro concettuale per un inquadramento dei meccanismi regolatori privati: l’Accordo interistituzionale del 2003. – 3.1. L’autoregolazione. – 3.2. La coregolazione. – 4. Le variabili che condizionano i meccanismi regolatori privati nella prassi. – 4.1. L’autoregolazione nella prassi. – 4.2. La coregolazione nella prassi. 5. Considerazioni conclusive.

While it must be noted that phenomenon of private regulation as such has certainly gained much interest in constitutional scholarship, only scarce attention has so far been given to the exploration of private regulation within the particular context of the EU’s constitutional set-up. In this essay an attempt has been made to overcome some of this scarcity in the scholarly literature by approaching the phenomenon of private regulatory authority at EU level from the particular angle of EU constitutional law. Special emphasis has, however, been put on the consideration of private regulation on the field of emerging technologies, in particular “legislation-induced co-regulation”, in the light of the principle of conferral.

di Ermanno Calzolaio

SOMMARIO: 1. Il fenomeno bitcoin come esempio di autoregolazione. – 2. I caratteri del fenomeno bitcoin. – 3. L’autoregolazione nella concreta realtà applicativa. – 4. Le prime iniziative regolatorie nel diritto dell’Unione Europa. – 5. La proposta di regolamento europeo sulle cripto-attività. – 6. Spunti conclusivi.

This paper considers the phenomenon of bitcoins, the best known cryptocurrency, commonly presented as a means of self regulation, because its circulation does not require the intermediation of central authorities, thanks to the use of the blockchain system. However, due to the enormous costs, concretely the circulation of bitcoins occur off chain, through platforms implemented by relatively few private companies. This means that a regulation does exist, but it is left to the private initiative. Moving from this statement, the paper briefly considers the recent EU regulatory initiative lauched in September 2020, putting in evidence its main contents and also its limits. In particular, the ‘a-territorial’ character of bitcoins questions the efficacy of the attempt to encapsulate their regulation within territorial ambits. The challenge for jurists (legislators, academics, judges) is to catch the new ‘global’ perspective of phenomena like bitcoins requiring to pass across the national legal orders in order to understand (and regulate) them.

** Professore ordinario di Diritto privato comparato nell’Università degli Studi di Macerata.

Contatto: Questo indirizzo email è protetto dagli spambots. È necessario abilitare JavaScript per vederlo.

di Raffaella Niro

SOMMARIO: 1. Piercing the platform veil nella “concurring opinion” del Justice Thomas - 2. Un passo indietro. Piattaforme digitali e libertà di espressione: dalla “ricchezza delle reti” alla concentrazione dell’informazione nelle mani di pochi - 3. Gli interventi di “content moderation”: condizioni contrattuali o regole limitative della libertà di espressione? In margine all’autoregolazione delle piattaforme - 4. Il dibattito fra le due sponde dell’Atlantico: fra “state doctrine action” e “drittwirkung”, gli strumenti di difesa della libertà di espressione nei confronti dei poteri privati - 5. La rinuncia degli Stati alla regolazione e la devoluzione alle piattaforme del potere normativo. Fra autoregolazione e coregolazione - 6. Verso il Digital Service Act, fra vecchi e nuovi paradigmi di regolazione.

Starting from the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas in Biden v. Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, 593 U.S. (2021) case - the paper analyzes the issue of the private regulation of free speech restrictions on digital platforms. Since 2000, dominant digital platforms – which provide avenues for historically unprecedented amounts of speech - started using policies of “content moderation”, so as not to lose users, prohibiting messages related to hate speech or fake news, defined by the platforms themselves, in the conditions of service. The paper shows how - both in the USA and in Europe- the public authorities have left it to the platforms themselves to dictate the rules, allowing freedom of speech to be stifled by private parties, without any liability. Also the model of coregulation - followed in Europe to adopt the EU Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online and the Code of Practice on Disinformation and now in view of the approval of the Digital Service Act - turned out to be similar to the model of self-regulation, as it is equally entrusted to the platforms to identify the limits to freedom of speech. This raises the question of the twisting of sovereignty, by assigning to platforms the role of law making.

di Edoardo Caterina

SOMMARIO: 1. Alla ricerca di uno statuto costituzionale della comunicazione elettorale online. – 2. Il diritto della comunicazione elettorale online: caratteristiche peculiari. – 3. Il (non-) diritto elettorale delle piattaforme digitali. – 4. Il finanziamento della propaganda politica online. – 5. Conclusioni (con alcune proposte).

In this paper I will try to address, from a constitutional law perspective, the issues raised by digital campaigning and online political advertisements. The first question to be tackled is: how does the regulation of political advertisements on the social media differ from the regulation of campaign advertising on traditional media? The lack of a legal framework in this area is highly problematic, given the crucial importance of online propaganda in shaping public opinion. But if the lawmaker is inert and does not regulate, this does not mean that regulation cannot come from other parties. Such parties are the 'digital platforms' themselves. These actors have autonomously issued some rules in this delicate field. Is this self-regulation sufficient? And if not, what should a possible ex lege regulation look like? What room should be left for self-regulation in any case? In other words, how should co-regulation be shaped in practice?

di Giacomo Menegus

SOMMARIO 1. Introduzione. – 2. Sharing economy: difficoltà definitorie. – 3. La regolazione agli albori della sharing economy: gli argomenti a favore della self-regulation… – 4. …e gli orientamenti sovranazionali: l’Agenda europea per l’economia collaborativa e la comunicazione Piattaforme online e Mercato unico digitale. – 5. L’evoluzione concreta del panorama regolatorio negli Stati membri: il caso Airbnb... – 6. …e i riflessi sul piano europeo: l’iniziativa della Commissione sugli affitti brevi. – 7. Critica agli argomenti a favore della self-regulation. – 8. Conclusioni: oltre la self-regulation.

The paper investigates the regulatory processes in the sharing economy, an economic sector in which the technological factor plays a crucial role in shaping the regulatory intervention both by private and public actors. The aim is to evaluate, from a constitutional perspective, whether it is possible to rely on self-regulation by sharing economy actors (i.e. platforms and users). After having defined sharing economy, the arguments in favour of self-regulation and reputational mechanisms at the dawn of the sharing economy are outlined on the basis of existing literature and guidance instruments issued by the European Commission. Then, focusing on the case of the home-sharing platform Airbnb, how the regulatory processes tend to move beyond the approach based on self-regulation is shown. The paper also provides a practical and theoretical criticism of online reputational mechanisms as regulatory tools. The conclusion is that self-regulation alone is not an appropriate instrument to regulate sharing economy. Self-regulation is not fit to strike a balance between the interests of sharing economy actors on the one hand and the interests of other citizens and the public on the other.

Contatto: Questo indirizzo email è protetto dagli spambots. È necessario abilitare JavaScript per vederlo.