Il ripensamento del Comitato per la legislazione: non un organo rinnovato, ma un organo diverso

di Giovanni Piccirilli

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione: ripensare il Comitato per la legislazione in sede di riscrittura delle regole tra esigenze di “manutenzione” regolamentare e volontà di innovazione. - 2. Le (radicali) modifiche alla composizione del Comitato. - 3. Le competenze (davvero) nuove del Comitato e le loro criticità. - 4. Conclusioni: dalle ipotesi di riforma emerge non un Comitato “rinnovato”, ma un organo diverso e, probabilmente, meno incisivo.

The comprehensive draft reform of the rules of procedure of the Chamber of deputies includes also some specific provisions related to the Committee on Legislation (Comitato per la legislazione). This body, introduced in 1998 as a non-partisan Committee devoted to the expression of opinions on the quality of the legislation, would be radically changed both in its composition and in its functions by the proposed amendments. It is true that the rules governing this body were in a desperate need for a consolidation (as many novelties to the existing norms have been introduced informally either through opinions of the Committee on the rules of procedure or in the parliamentary practice). Nevertheless, the way in which the text published in December 2013 risks emptying the role and the influence that the Committee was able to acquire in its 16 years of functioning. Firstly, its composition would be changed in order to reflect the proportions among political groups. This might put at risk its working dynamics based on the compromise between the majority and the opposition, and would affect the neutrality of its opinions. Secondly, the textual conditions included in its opinion would be automatically transformed into amendment to be voted on the bill at issue. Even though this might be seen as an empowerment of the Committee, in practice it means to force it to release only weak opinions, full of “observation” instead of textual conditions. Being aware of the necessary vote on the conditions posed by its opinions, the Committee could otherwise only become a sort of veto power in the legislative process, but this is impossible for a body reflecting the majority of the Assembly. In conclusion, if some intervention for the consolidation of the existing norms governing the Committee on legislation were surely needed, those published in December 2013 risk to marginalize the Committee and, in the end, to deprive the Chamber of its positive influence on the legislative process.